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THE ROLE OF COMMODITY BOARDS IN FOOD CROP PRODUCTION AND MARKETING

NIGERIA

Consequently, the main tfuust of the reforms introduced

Introduc'tion

into the system in 1973 was to ensure tlat the operations
of the boards, and especiatly their pricing policies, would
not have such harmful effects on farm activity. This was
done partly by making the Federal Government the
motivator of pricing policy and partly by paying financial
compensation to state govemments lrom federal funds
for "losses" arising from the reforms.
Throughout this period when these changes were
taking place in respect of the marketing boards, government paid little attention to the market organization for

Nigeria has had a fairly long history of government
intervention in agricultural marketing. But, for most of
the time, government interest centred around the socalled export or cashl crops such as cocoa, groundnuts,
palm produce, cotton, benniseed, soyabeans and rubber.
This interest was dictated by three factors: first, the
colonial government wanted an emcient system of
evacuating the badly needed raw materials to factories
overseas; second, the export of these crops was the main
source of foreign exchange required to finance imports,
and third, the output ofthese crops was subject to various
forms of taxes which became an important source of
government revenue.
Between 1947 and 1975, the well-known form of
government intervention was through the creation of
marketing boards which were semi-aulonomous inst.itutions charged with purchasing the export crops from
producers.2 The main objectives of the marketing boards
were to stabilize producer prices, maintain and control an
efficient organization for the purchase of these crops,
improve the quality ofthe crops and promote the development ofthe producing areas. s The general evidence on the
extent to which these objectives were attained indicated
that the boards tended to concentrate on that aspect of
their functions which enjoins them to promote the
development of the producing areas., This was generally
done by deliberately accumulating surpluses from their
operations which were then transferred to the regional
(state) governments to finance general development
expenditures.a While many ofthe investments undertaken

the staple food crops. In fact, this was only an aspecl

ofthe

interest in evolving a food policy in
various Devel,opment Plans betwe€n 1945 and 1975.
This situation may be explained by the fact that no
serious food problem had emerged (at least up to 1966) to
compel govemment to play a more active role in the
development of these crops. Above all, various studies
undertaken on the specific subject of food marketing and
distribution generally indicated that, although the markec
general lack

of

ing system for the staple food crops exhibited many forms
of inefficiency, it was fairly efficient and competitive
under the conditions it operated.2
However, as the food supply probtem worsened after the
civil war. govemment took greater interest in promoting
increased production and improved distribution of foodstuffs. In the area of marketing and distribution, one of its
earliest actions was the formulation of a policy to encourage the formation of food marketing cooperatives.3
The rationale of policy is that the scale advantage of
cooperative marketing, as opposed to individual efforts
would enhance production. Such advantages include the

with such funds were quite productive, there was sumcient
evidence that the fiscal role which the boards were made to
play had adverse affects on agricultural production and
the rural sector of the economy.l

relatively greater ability to obtain credit facilities and
reduction in marketing costs. In 1976, government
intervention in food marketing and distribution became
more direct when it established two commodity boards
the Nigerian Grains Board and the Nigerian Root and
Tuber Crops Board-to perform a wide range of
marketing functions. The Grains Board is to deal in
sorghum, millet, maize, wheat, rice and beans (cowpea),
while the Root and Tuber Crops Board is to deal in yams
and cassava. But early in 1979, the Root and Tuber Board
was dissolved and some of its functions transferred to the
National Root Crops Production Company (See Part II).
This was done partly to avoid duplication of effort and
partly because of initial operational problems which

I The

coDccpts "expon/cash" no longer exactly convey the meaning
attached to them since a large proportiou of these crops is now process€d locally. But these concepts will be used in this analysis for convenienceand to conform with coovcntional usagc.
2 Initially, a scparate marketing board was sq up for each major export

crop, but *ith the constitutiotral changes introduced in 1954, each
region c eated its own cross-commodity marteting board, while a
cmtral sales orgaDization was charged with the overceas sales o[
produce.

t

IN

F.A.O., Agriculrural Developrnent rn ivigezo. 1965 80, Rome, 1966,
pp. 349-350.
for example, CeDtral Bank of Niteria,

a See,

"A

Review of the Opera-

tions of the Westero Nigpria Marketing Board, l%3/64-1968/69*,

I

2 See Referetrces 10,

C.B.N. Economic atd Fin@r.ial Revi?rr. Vol. 9, No. 2, December, l97l .
Dupe Olatunbosun and S. O. Olayide, "Effects ofMarketing Boards on
Irlcome and Output of Primary Producers", in Dupe Olatuobosun and
H. M. A. Onitiri (eds.), Tbe Markering Board Syrren: Proceedings of
an IDtemational Confcrence, Ibadan, 1974-

I
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16,24and26.

Prior to this period, cooperative agricultural marketing iD the country
had a bias for the export crops, while staple lood crops were virtually
ignored. See, for examplc, chapters on agricultural development
progammes in thePlans from 1962. (Rcferences 17, lt& 19).

faced the Board. Under the same law s€tting up these two

Thus, the boards for the export as well as those for

boards, the previous state cross-commodity marketing
boards were dissolved and replaced by nation-wide
commodity boards for cocoa (including coffee and tea),

staple food crops were required, under the law, to perform
the same broad functions. This paperpresents a discussion
of government intervention in food production and
marketing in Nigeria with particular reference to the use
of commodity boards. The rest of the paper is organized

groundnus (including soyabeans, benoiseed, sheanuts and
ginger), cotton (including kenaf and tobacco), palm
produce (including copra) and rubber.l In essence, this
merely restord the system that existed before 1954 with
only slight modifications such as grouping similar pro-

into three parts. Part I discusses the role of mmmodity
boards in food production and distribution, with emphasis
on the marketing problems which the new boards are
expected to remove. Part II analyses theeffectiveness ofthe

ducts together.

boards in removing these problems and performing other

INigeria: Federal Mitristry of Information, Lagos, Supple ent
Ofrcial Gazette No. 18, VoI. 54, April 21. 197?. PanA,pp.

l5l

related functions. The concluding part contains a discussion of some of the major findings and policy implications of the analysis.

ro

164.

Pirt I
PROBLEMS OF MARKETING STAPLE FOOD
CROPS AI\[D FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMODITY
BOARNS

(a)

lhe size of profit margins. Artifcially high prices
lead to excess profits which in tum result in the
reduction of consumer welfare:
(D/ pricing and operational efficiency which, respectively, relate to the economic power structure in the
system and the cost of providing or marketing
goods and services; and
(c) :gtaslzge in the marketing process.2
Using these criteria as a framework for evaluating the
performance of the private food marketing systern in
Nigeria up to 1976, it is easy to isolate several areas of
inefficiency,3 but, as indicated earlier, some authors have
shown that the system has performed relatively well

Th€ Structur€ of the Privst€ M.rketing system
Generally, there are three goups of participants in the
marketing channel for staple food crops: the farmers, the
middlernen/traders and the consumers. At one end of the
marketing channel are the farmer5. The nature and
structure of production, as well as the manner of transfer
of ownership of output bear some relationship to the
whole structure of the food marketing system. The bulk

of production is undertaken by p€asant farmers who
engage largely in subsistent production with primitive
technology. Under the land tenure system, farm plots may
be scattered over a wide area. The marketing channel for
food crops features the usual pattem of middlemen,
wholesalers and retailers. However, there are several
types of or layers of wholesalers and retailers, which
makes the marketing channel longer than what is consistent with emcient marketing. Apart from wholesalers and

given the constraints under which

it

functioned. With

respect to the size ofprofit margins, the fragmentary data
are not up-to-date and hardly reliable. But, while review-

ing studies by A. R. Thodey and Q. B- O. Anthonio,
Olayuni and Jones concluded that, while the available
evidence is not sufficient middlernen do not se€m to earn

retailers, the farm-gate middlemen, the commissioned and
non-commissioned agents, farmers' marketing coopera-

excessive profits as often alleged.l

tives and contract traders have also been identified as
important participants in the channel.t The proliferation
of intermediate agents arises largely because of the
small-scale nature of output which thus requires a large
number of persons to assemble food for ultimate marketing in central narkets. In the central markets, supplies are

On pricing efficiency, there are certain observable
factors that tend to reduc€ the competitiveness of the
market structure. These include inter-personal relationships that often exist between sellers and buyers, the
formation of powerful trade associations by setlers of
the same commodity, the emer.gence of contract traders
who supply food to large institutions, the result of which
has been a gradual change in the structure offood demand

broken into smaller quantities to meet the requirements of
consumers. At the other end of the marketing channel are
the consumers, most of whom are low-income earners
and dernand food products largely in small quantities at a
time.

Market Performance and Problems

a

There are several ways ofevaluating the performance

marketing system,

of

R. L- Kohls and W. D. Do*ney, Marketing of Ayicuhwal ProYork, 1972, Chapter L
I These probleDs have b€en idcntified in several studies. (Rderences
t, 16,24,26\.
I t.K. Olayefi, Food Ma*etht and Dittribution i Ni$tia: Prcblerns
ard Prospert, NISER, Ibadan, 1974.
2 See

but the most commonly-used

ducrs, New

criteria are:
I See Q. B. O. Anthonio, "Distributors in Foodstuffs' Marlets in
Nigcria",in Alricq Urban lyarer. Vol.5, No. 2, 1970.
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(c) 'f\ey are to promote the "development and

and barrierc to entry created by the size of initial capital
requirement and the scarcity of market stalls. One other
factor that may inhibit pricing efficiency is the lack of

rehabilitation" of the producing areas generally.
Some of their required roles in this regard include:

ensuring an adequate supply of fertilizers,
improved seeds and other inputs, as well as

market information service. A good knowledge of
developments by all participants regulates their actions
at the various stages of the marketing channel and
improves the functioning of the system. Currently, no
institution has an acaurate knowledge of such vital
information such as trends in national and regional
production, market supply and dernand, stocks, price

conducting research into the production, handling,
marketing and pest control for the relevant
commodities.

(d)

movements, marketing and production costs. One conwide ffuctuations both spatially and inter-temporally.l

a number of factors which

reduce

give general guidelines concerning the sale price of
each commodity. A Technical Committee on
Producer Prices, cotrsisting of the Permanent
Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, as Chair-

operational efficiency and cause excessive wastage of food
in the markaing process. Ftst is the acute shortage of
some basic marketing facilities such as storage facilities
both at the producing point and the cenral markels.
This deficiency causes excessive fluctuations in food
prices and wastage of output. For instance, it has been
estimated ftat the proportion of output of major staple
food crops lost through lack of storage facilities ranges on
the average between 9 and 25 per cent.3 The second is the

man, and representatives of some economic minis-

tnes and departments, the Central Bank of
Nigeria, and the Commodity Boards was set up to
advise the Price Fixing Authority.

f",

inadequate trnsponation network, especially in the rural

producers and improve marketing efficiency, both of
which will ultimately induce increased food produclion
and consequently ensure that consumers obtain foodstuffs
at reasonable prices.

The law establishing the boards sgrecifies three main
sources from which their activities may be financed:
loans and advances from the Central Bank of Nigeria,
surplus funds generated from their operations and
subventions from the Federal Government. Loans and
ad'i'ances from the Central Bank are to be guaranteed by
the Federal Government and are used to finance the

Functiom end Operrtioos of the Commodity Borrds
The Decree2 (Commodity Boards Decree, 1977) setting
up the commodity boards stipulated the following five
broad functions for the boards:
(a) They are to make adequate arrangements for the
purchase of the relevant commodity and make
sales to both the domestic and extemal markets.
To facilitate this, the boards were required to

boards' operational expenses which include th€ cost of
procuring produce from farmers, allowances payable to
licensed buying agents, charges for storaBe, transportation, insurance and handling and cost of equipments.

establish buying centres and construct warehous€s
in all major producing areas, as well as arrange for
the transportation of products to storage depots
for sale to consumers.
The boards are required to purchase all scheduled

Loans are repaid as soon as the Central Bank is credited
with proceeds from sales as required under the law.
Internal funds generated through surpluses from sales,
earnings from inyestmcnts and borrowing from other
sources are used to financ€ administrative expenses under
which are included staff emoluments, subsidies granted to
farmers for the supply of inputs and to conduct research.
Finally, loans and grants are given by the Federal Govemment to finance the boards' capital expenditures such as
those incurred in the provision of infrastructures (office
and residential accommodation and storage facilities)
and processing plants.
With resp€ct to human resources, the boards were

commodities which are offered for sale to them
provided they conform with stipulated grades and
standards of quality. They are to make purchases
from producers through appointed licensed buying
agents or farmers' cooperative societies.
2

I

Finally, they are ernporvered to enpage in industrial
processing of the commodities unde! their control.

In brief, these functions were designed to achieve two
broad objectives: to provide some economic incentives to

areas which ranain largely inaccessible because of the
absence of feeder roads. Anthonio has also expressed
doubt as to the ability of the transportation network to
adjust supply and dernand overtime and space due to its
riskiness, unreliability and substantial losses often sustained in transit.l

/b)

to support and stabilize the price of the

relevant commodity. The Head of the Federal
Government (i.e. the President) is designated the
Price Fixing Authority whose primary role is to
fix the producer price of each commodity and to

sequence of these factors is that food prices often exhibit

There also exist

T]hey are

Q. B. O. Anthonro, "Problems of Markeriog Agricultural Products
wilh Special Rtference to Foodstufrs in Nigcria" in L M. Ofori,
Factots of Agticl/hural Gtuteth in West Aftico, l*Eon, l9'll, pp.

25141.

Natiooal Agricultural DevclopmeotcodmitLe, Report of the Ndional
Committee on Food Marketing Problems. Federal Department of
Agriculture, tagos, 1972, p. 4.
I Q. B. O. Anthooio, Op. cit.

the open labour market to recruit staff to run their

2 Federal MiDistry of InformarioD. Lagos I op. ctl.

operations.

allocated

a few of the staff of the

existing marketing

boards. Besides this, the boards would have to resort to
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PART II

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
COMMODIry BOARD
SYSTEM IN FOOD PRODUCTION AND

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

MARKETING

In spite of the major findings of the several studi€s
which have not generally favoured the creation ofgovernment-controlled marketing boards for staple food crops,l
its conceptual framework may not be completely antithetical to increased food production and the achievement
of a more emcient marketing system. As presendy con-

encourage the creation of an
effective market information service. This is
possible because under the price-fixing arrangements, the Technical Committee on Producer
Prices is expected to advise the Price Fixing
Authority on producer prices to be fixed for each
commodity. Before this can be done, the Committee must assemble the n@essary information
such as marketing expenses, production costs,
prices, trends in production and position ofsupply
and dernand. This will be done only if the boards
cao set up the necessary administrative structure
that can generate independently some of this
information and effectively utilize the existing

fd) The systern can

ceived. the creation ofcommodity boards hasconsiderable
potential for achieving fie desired objectives. There are,

however, many potential constraints that can hamper

their operations.
Adyantlges of tte Commodity Board System
The main advantages of the system are realizable

frcn
thc provisions made to alleviate the problons of the

private marketing system:
/aJ The new systan may reduce unnecessary exploitation of producers. This is possible becaus€ tlre

sources.

Mrjor

commodity boards' decree stipulates that tlE
boards shall operate alongside the existing market-

/6)

/c,

directly or indirectly to two factors: availability of the
executive capacity and adequate financial resources. A
further assessment of the functions and operations of

ing channels in all aspects except in the export
trade over which they have a monopoly. At the
same time, producers are not compelled to sell
their produce to them. The attainment ofthis goal
is however dependent on the ability of the boar6
to acquire an efficient administrative structure
and adequate resources for their op€rations to
make an impact on the system.
In principle, the operations of the boards would
lead to increased supply ofinfrastructural facilities.
This may lead to an improved distribution ne!
work which can induce geater supply through
reduced loss ofoutput and new cultivation. Again,
the realization of this objective will be largely
determined by the availability of skilled manpower
and capital to execute and manage the relevant

the boards as specified by the Decree and other relevant
government policies suggest that these two factors can
pose serious problems for their operations.

(a) The financial

infrastructural and storage facilities should

lead to lesser spatial and seasonal price fluctuations. and coupled with certainty in price offered
to producers under the pricing policy, should go
far in encotraging more output. To attain this
a

sufficient impact on the system.
I
I

Sec Rcfereoces 10,

for the

boards

administrative expenses, and give assistance to
farmers in the form of some farm inputs, the
boards are expected to generate surpluses from
their own operations. The prospects for doing
this are rather uncertain because they hare little
control over their costs, at least in the short-run.
The producer price is determined through a
process of consultation and once fixed cannot be
changed by the boards. Also, owing to rising
prices in the economy, marketing costs cannot
also b€ controlled and experience in other less
developed countries suggests that costs of government marketing agencies are inherently higho
than normal because of large emoluments, less
careful handling, overtapitalizz tion and underutilization of capacity. t There is also some unc€rtainty about subventions from the Federal

and through the adoption of an efective pricing
policy can enhance food production. Theprovision

objective, the boards' olerations must make

provisions made

have an elernent of uncertainty built into them
and therefore are likely to constrain a systematic
implementation of their plans. Providing for their
operational expenses is not likely to be a problem
since finance should flow from the Cenral Bank
as long as purchases are being made. To finance

investment projects.
The system may a.lso lead to greater price stabilityl

of

Constraints on the Operatiom of the Boards

The necessary conditions for maximizing the advantages
derivable from the commodity board system are traceable

i6,26.

Price stability in this case oblains mainly from the point of view of
producers. For consumcrs, lhere (,ould bc an upper limit to markel
price only through the boards sales.

I
24

See Reference

lJ

(b)

(c) The

manpower constraints which are likely ro
face the boards can be roughly assessed against
the background of general shortage of executive
capacity in the country's post-independenoe planning experience.l This bottleneck appears to have
hampered the agricultural sector more than other
sectors probably because of the long apathy of
government towards the dwelopment of the
sector until recently. The result is that most

Government due in large part to the need to meet
the minimum requests of many agencies.2
This last point on competition for scarce government resourc€s seems to have a wider scope when
considered in the context of the boards' areas of
activity. The areas of activity of the boards are
also in the domain of other govemment agencies
or the private sector. Four of these are worth

mentioning. First, in the area of provision of

agricultural institutions in the country lack the
necess:rry skilled manpower to plan, implanent

infrastructural facilities, a careful review of Federal
and State agricultural development prograflrmes
suggests that many projects have been designed to
ameliorate the scarcity of these facilities.l Second,
the supply of fertilizers, improved seeds and oths
inputs have. similarly been made an important
asp€ct of such development programmes. In fact,
the role which fertilizers can play in agricultural
production is reflected in the setting up of an
agency of the Federal Govemment to procure and

f4

and evaluate even well-conceived projects.
Although the commodity boards are expected to
implement a pricing policy that has been designed
by govemment, the type of pricing policy
they are called upon to execute can affect
their effectiveness. Under the pricing policy,

are fixed for
various staple food crops, implying
that the producer may sell his produce to the

guaranteed minimum prices

the

distribute them via a channel embracing state
goverDments, extension and transpoi agents and
the farmers.2 Third, food processing is a productive activity in which private industry and some

boards when the current marka price falls below

the guaranteed minimum price for the crop
affected and he is also free to dispose of his crop
in the open market at prices that are higher than
the guaranteed minimum prices. The rationale of a
guaranteed minimum price is to insure producers
against low prices, but at the same time to enable
them take advantage of periods of high prices.
Another attractive feature of a guaranteed minimum price policy is that it involves the smallest

government schemes have over the years achieved
some measure of success. This is particularly so
in the case of expon crops (cocoa, groundnuts,
patn oil). In respect of staple food crops, private

industry has recently begun to make commendable
progress. Fourth, agricultural researdr has always
been an important function of several govemment
agencies and at this juncture in time, the main
problern seems to be how to organize effective
coordination and application of research results.
Finally, all these functions (except research and
input supply) are also expected to be performed
by two limited liability companies set rp and

interference with the price mechanism of the
market compared with other types of guaranteed
prices such as the price range or fixed price.
These apparent benefits ofa guaranteed minimum price
policy have to be considered against the background of a

particular agricultural economy. In the context of
Nigerian conditions, the adoption of this pricing policy

wholly owned by the Federal Govemmart. These
are the National Grains Production Company
(Kaduna) and the National Root Crop6 Produo
tion Company (Enugu) which ar€ to produce,
purchasc, process, store and market grains/
legumes and root/tuber crops.s Overall, the
competition for scarce resources may put the
boards at a disadvantage in that they are completely new organizations in the govanmfital

implies some assumptions:

i)
fii)
f

fi,l)

that shortages in food supply are temporary;
that producers benefit from prevailing high prices
offood; and
that what producers require is a roduction in risk

of

Ioss.

However, these implied assumptions are not generally
valid. In the first place, food shortages rernained a major
economic problem throughout the 1970s. There is no
evidence to suggest that the major factors in this situation
were about to be reversed at the time of instituting the

system.

pricing policy. The'grovrth in food demand had not
2

I
2

I

abated and the supply situation had not appreciably
responded to policy measures. For instance, betweqr
1970 and 1975, food supply in the country grer at an
annual rate ofone per cent, while food demand increased

During thc 1975 80 Plan, about N17.5 million *Bs earmarked for the
s€vetr boards by fie Fedfial Govemmmt. Bul at the end of the plan
pcriod onlyabout N5 6 million wasactually giveD ro them
and 19.
The F€deral Ministry of Agriculture has a Fertilizer Procurement and
Distribution Division which procures the fcrtilizers through impona'
lion or local sourc€s aller talbg into account requests by state
governments. exrsting facilities in the country and general economic
policy of the govemment.
Evcn the strateSy adopted by setting up these companies is not in itself
fr€€ ofcontroversy. S€e, for instance(22).
See References 17, 18

at an annual rate of about 4 per c€nt. t

I See Refercnces 17, lE, 19 & 20.
I See M. O. Ojo, "Trends in Food

Supply and DcEaod in
196(HO" (unpublishcd Cerlral Bank of N igeria mimeo).
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Nigc

a,

In the second place, there is no concrete evidence to
show lhat the average food producer has deliberately
set out or has been induced to benefit from prevailing high
food prices. Admittedly, the large scale farmers located
rcrtr urban centres and on good highways have tak€n
ad\ antage of current high prices to expand their operatio:rs. But the average farmer continues to engage in
.ul,sistent production and the traditional practice by
whrch small surpluses of food are carried on heads to
locul markets lor sale persists.2 The dominance of the
I

middlemen is still apparent in the distribution system.
In the third place, Nigerian agriculture remains backward in many respects, the major bottleneck being the
limited technological capability of tire economy. Under
this situation, agricultural production is grossly handicapped. This situation is not as in developed countries
where the production capability exists, but where this
production may not be forthcoming because of the great
risk olloss involved.

For majority of farmers, the constraints seem to b€ inadequate incen-

This however relates to the issue ofprice responsiveness of producers
price changes. More serious empi.ical studies (see studies cited
by Criffin and Enos (7) generally cotrfrm the observation Inade here.

to

tives arising from tenurial arrangements, poor infrastructural facilities

and inability to obtain inputs-fertilizers, insecticides and credit.

Psrt III
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Presently, a lot ofinformation is compiled by the Federal
Omce of Statistics and States' statistical units. Perhaps an
approach may be for the Federal Ministry ofAgriculture
to have its own Statistical Division as is done all over the
world and such a Division can then effectively coordinate
what is available and plan for improvernent.

The establishment olcommodity boards for staple food
crops in 1976 by the Federal Govemment represented an

important dimension in that, up till that time, such
governmenl intervention in agricultural products marketing was confined to the export-oriented crops. The
primary objectives ofthe food crop boards are to promote

One desirable objective which the creation

increased food production through a package of economic

incentives including a guaranteed minimum price and
subsidies on input supply, and improvement in marketing
emciency by providing more marketing and infrastructural facilities. From a purely theoretical context, the
objectives of creating the boards could be attained
through th€ approach adopted. But the ability of the

Boards

to perform their functions effectively may

boards might have sought

ment of marketing cooperatives to attain the same goal
seems to have a wide appeal because of the obvious
advantages: increased bargaining power for producers,
and inducement of less collusive market behaviour on the
part of private traders. The evidence on the general
performance of marketing cooperatives in less developed
countries does suggest that they have not performed
much better than government agencies and where they
cannot be compared with similar govemment agencies.
they haye proved to be unsuccessful, particularly in the
area of food crops.l
But this situation has been attributed to the lack of
adequate supervision by govemment and skilled management. In spite of this, the marketing cooperative s€ems to
be generally preferred in the attainment of the goal

be

problems.

On the whole, the creation of the food crop boards is
ag cultural
policy that have been undertaken to achieve some
one of several institutional reforms in recent

it seems there were several other
approaches that could attain the same objectives. One
priority in food marketing reform seems to be the removal
desirable objectives. But

stated above- In this connection, both the state and Federal
Governments have initiated, since the early 1970s,

basic constraints enumerated in the paperinadequate infrastructure, poor transport, storage and

of the

programmes to revamp the cooperative movement. At
the national level, this has been reflected in the creation ofa
Department of Agricultural Cooperatives and in the
States existing cooperatives have been revitalised and
new ones encouraged to be set up. The underlying
strategy of these programmes is to make cooperati\€

processing facilities. These constraints have attracted the
attention of the Federal. State and Local Governments in
theirvarious development programmes. Given the urgency
which the Federal Governm6nt attaches to their removal.
it can render more resistance to state and local govern-

or

execute some projects

in

a component of an integrated approach to
agricultural production so as to complanent other

cooperation with

marketing

state and local governments. The problems of inadequate
supply of farm inputs, the control ofpests and diseases and

research can be similarly handled. The lack

the

engender
competitionin the existing market structure. The establish-

conslrained by several factors such as the non-availability
of the executive capacity and inadequate financial
resources given the financial provisions made for their
operations. These are, however, noa insurmountable

ments

of

to achieve was to

programmes of input supply, credit and price stabilization.

of market

information has to be tackled within a framework for the
reform ofthe agricultural statistical system ofthe country.

I
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See References 13

and

19

The strates/ should be to remove the basic constraints
outlined earlier and to emphasize policy measures that
are capable of reducing production costs and croP
losses. But ifthere is need fora pricing policy, an agency is
needed to implement it. However, it was not necessary to
create two boards for this purpose initially. In future, the
implementing agency can be the one in charge of the
Strategic Grain Storage Programme.
A note of caution is called for in interpreting some of

One obvious conclusion from the review ofthe guaranteed minimum price policy is that it could be of limited
application under our present condilions. In fact, one

signal to the fact that an alternative pricing policy is
required is the impact produced by the discriminatory
price policy adopted in respect of the Strategic Grain
Storage Programme. Under it, the Grains Board has been
commissioned to purchase grains for storage (and later
disposal) at prices much higher than the guaranteed
minimum prices and the response from farmers was
quite impressive.2 This, notwithstanding, one bast
argument of the analysis still holds, that is, that the
under-developed nature of the agricultural sector is likely
to place a limitation on the success of any pricing policy.

our observations in this paper. Because of bureaucratb
procedures and initial problems, the boards did not take
off early enough. which has made it difficult to effeclively
evaluate their operations. This analysis can thus only be
regarded as a preliminary attempt to evaluate the role of
commodity boards in food production and marketing in
Nigeria.

1

Under the storage scheme, lhe prices of sorghum and rice (paddy)
were fixed at X290 and ia350 per tonne, respectively in 1978179 and
about 43 thousand tonnes of these crops w€re sold to the Board by
farmers, For the satrte s€ason, the guaranteed mioimultl prices of
sorgbum and rice were fixcd at l{l l0 and N240 f,cr tonne and only 3
thousand tonoes ofproduce wcrc sold to theBoard.

M. O. OJO
Research Department

Central Bank of Nige ria
Lagos

Offcial Gozeue,No.18, Vol.64, April2l, 1977. Pan A(Commodity
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